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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
QUALIFIED TRUTH DEFENSE
TO LIBEL ACTIONS
MICHAEL

J.

POLELLE*

The supremacy of federal law assures the amenability of
even state constitutions to a continuing judicial scrutiny designed
to guarantee compliance with the Federal Constitution. The
launching of modern constitutional reform at the state level must
therefore increasingly take account of the growing barrier reef
of federal constitutional law. It appears that article I, section
4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution has foundered upon that reef.
In adopting this section, the Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention decided to keep the 1870 constitutional provision that
truth shall be a defense in all libel cases if uttered for good
motives and justifiable ends, with full knowledge that a year
earlier the Illinois Supreme Court had declared the 1870 provision a violation of the first amendment of the United States Constitution. 1 The failure to heed judicial warnings when drafting
the 1970 Illinois Constitution has led only seven years later to
further doubt about the validity of this qualified truth defense in
any libel case. Although at one level this article is a discussion of
the constitutionality of the qualified truth defense under current
United States Supreme Court decisions, the broader question inevitably involved is whether the 1970 Illinois convention unnecessarily launched article I, section 4 on stormy constitutional
seas with the imminent prospect of shipwreck. The ultimate
aspect of this broader question is whether there were other alternatives available to the convention which would have offered
better prospects for withstanding the first amendment challenge
to the validity of article I, section 4.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALIFIED TRUTH DEFENSE

Under English common law, the justification of truth when
pleaded as a defense to a defamatory statement had completely
contrary results in civil and criminal law. In civil law the defense of truth when proved was an absolute defense to the
* A.B. (Honors), Loyola University; J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.
M., The John Marshall Law School. Mr. Polelle is a Professor of Law
at The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge
the student research assistance of Mr. Mark Moynihan.
1, Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
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defamation case,2 while in criminal law truth was not recognized
as a defense to defamation. 3 This antithetical result was due
to different policy premises. The theory of absolute defense in
civil law was based on the premise that the action of defamation
protects only against injury to the actual character of the plaintiff. Therefore, a defamatory statement which is true does no
harm to actual character because the plaintiff has merely suffered the deflation of a false reputation to the public eye.4 On
the other hand, the premise of the criminal law has traditionally
been that a defamatory statement is apt to cause a breach of the
peace and therefore should be punished regardless of its truth. 5
Indeed, the stinging truth of a defamatory statement may even
more readily goad the defamed victim into a breach of the peace.
The Illinois Constitutions of 1818 and 1848 did not seriously
depart from this common law tradition. Instead they simply provided generally that "every citizen may freely speak, write and
print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty" and that "truth" may be given in evidence in the course
of prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating public
officers or in prosecutions where the matter published was
proper for public information." The common law was apparently
altered only to the extent that truth became a defense in a rather
limited range of criminal prosecutions relating to public officials
or matters of public interest. Thus, even as early as 1818 and
1848, the peculiarly American notions of freedom of speech and
press had begun to supplant the goal of the criminal law to
eliminate potential causes of public disorder even at the price
of forfeiting truth.
The Illinois Constitution of 1870 substantially modified the
common law truth defense by providing in article II, section 4:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials
for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth when published with
good motives
and for justifiable ends shall be a sufficient de7
fense.
2. Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 417, 123 N.E.
587, 591-92 (1919).
3. People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116, 136, 87 N.E. 336, 342 (1901).
4. "The law will not permit a man to recover damages in respect
of injury to a character which he does not, or ought not to possess." McPherson v. Daniels, 109 Eng. Rep. 448 (K.B. 1829). Reasons later suggested are that a plaintiff with a bad character lacks standing, that a
defendant renders a public service in exposing a bad character, and that
public policy demands that truth not be fettered by fear of lawsuits. W.
PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 116, at 797 (4th ed. 1971).
5. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 418 (2d ed. 1969).
6. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 24 (1848); ILL. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 23
(1818).
7. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1870). "It was adopted with little debate
or discussion and with no explanation for the changes effected in the
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The Illinois Constitution of 1870 created a new and qualified
defense in all libel cases, requiring the defendant to prove not
only that the allegedly defamatory statement was true, but that
it was also uttered for good motives and justifiable ends. Where
no truth defense of any kind had existed at common law in
criminal cases, the Illinois Supreme Court held the qualified truth defense now applied.8 And while in civil libel cases
truth had previously been an absolute defense, in 1911 the
Illinois Appellate Court concluded in LaMonte v. Kent 9 that,
under the 1870 constitution, truth would be a defense in civil
libel cases only where "the publication was made with good
motives and for justifiable ends."
The application of the 1870 constitution to civil libel cases
met with an alternative interpretation in the 1914 case of Tilton
v. Maley. 10 Although the court was reluctant to discuss the alleged libel in detail, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had
published the "vices of youth long abandoned and forgotten.""
Despite the provision in the 1870 Illinois Constitution and the
uncited case of LaMonte v. Kent,12 the appellate court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court, which had permitted truth as
an absolute defense. The appellate court in Tilton recognized
that the sole issue in the case was whether truth was a sufficient
defense or whether the defendant must further show that the
truth was published with good motives and justifiable ends. In
justifying its decision the appellate court was confronted with
the difficult task of explaining how the earlier absolute defense
of truth in civil libel cases had survived the plain language of
article II, section 4 of the 1870 constitution.
The court found the solution to its dilemma by construing
article II, section 4 as creating a minimal standard of the truth
defense which must be accorded a defendant. This minimal protection to defendants who uttered truth in good faith, however,
did not prevent the legislature or the courts from broadening
the defense to an absolute one which would protect all defendants regardless of motives or ends. Having thus complied with
minimal constitutional requirements, the traditional absolute de1848

provisions."

(1969).

G.

BRADEN

& R.

COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

19

As of 1964 there were 26 jurisdictions besides Illinois which

made truth a defense if published with good motives and for justifiable
ends. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 71 n.7 (1964).

8. People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116, 87 N.E. 336 (1910); accord, People
v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925); People v. Taylor, 279 Ill.
481, 117 N.E. 62 (1917).

9. 163 Ill. App.1 (1911).

10. 186 Ill. App. 307 (1914).

11. Id. at 313.
12. 163 Ill. App.1 (1911).
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fense of the common law was still operative in civil libel cases
and incidentally provided more than the minimal protection by
shielding all defendants who told the truth, even those who did
so with bad motives and for unjustifiable ends.
Forced to explain why the Illinois Supreme Court had earlier
held that the defendant must prove the qualified truth defense
in criminal libel cases, the Tilton court noted that the Illinois
criminal statutes specifically provided that truth was a defense
to criminal libel only if qualified by good motives and justifiable
ends. The appellate court concluded that the Illinois legislature
could likewise limit the truth defense in civil libel cases, but that
until the legislature so specified, the 1870 Illinois Constitution
did not change the absolute truth defense in civil cases.
The tenuous reasoning of the Tilton case is apparent. If the
purpose of the 1870 constitutional drafters had not been to change
the common law absolute truth defense in civil cases, then the
language relating to good motives and justifiable ends was surplusage. It would, after all, be a rather curious constitutional
provision which implicitly preserved the absolute defense of
truth in civil cases by expressly conditioning the defense of truth
on the presence of good motives and justifiable ends. The Tilton
court's attempt to distinguish the contrary interpretation of the
Illinois Supreme Court in the criminal libel cases fares no better.
In those cases, the Illinois Supreme Court was interpreting the
requirement of the 1870 Illinois Constitution and was not interpreting criminal statutory law. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the 1870 constitution itself required that truth be
only a qualified defense in criminal libel cases. But it is unreasonable to interpret the constitution as giving more protection to
civil libel defendants than to criminal libel defendants where the
constitution itself made no such distinction. What impelled the
Tilton court toward its decision is not logic but a policy decision:
the presumed preference of freedom of speech over the protection
of harm to reputation. As the appellate court in Tilton clearly
stated:
But when we remember that this line of constitutional law
[article II, section 4] began in an attempt to give greater liberty
of speech, and its whole history down to the present time is to
guarantie [sic], as expressed in the title to our provision 'Freedom of speech and publication,' it seems to us judicial legislation
to give effect to the provision as abridging freedom of publication by repealing the existing common law, under which truth
13
alone was a sufficient defense.
Five years later the Illinois Supreme Court in Ogren v.
Rockford Star Printing Co.1 4 considered for the first time the
13. 186 Ill. App. at 313-14 (1914).
14. 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919).
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relevance of the 1870 Illinois Constitution in a civil libel case.
For the Illinois Supreme Court in Ogren, the defense of truth
in libel cases after the 1870 constitution was as qualified by
good motives and justifiable ends in civil cases as it was in
criminal cases. 15 The common law absolute defense of truth in
civil cases did not, after all, survive the 1870 constitution but
rather was reduced to a qualified truth defense. The Illinois
Supreme Court in Ogren based its conclusion on an identical provision of the Nebraska Constitution which had been held by
Nebraska courts to require that a defendant in a civil libel case
not only allege and prove the truth of the defamatory statement,
but also allege and prove that the statement, if true, was uttered
with good motives and justifiable ends. A puzzling aspect of the
Ogren case is its assertion that the application of the 1870 constitution to a civil libel case was one of first impression in Illinois.
The Illinois Supreme Court showed no awareness of the supportive LaMonte case, decided eight years previously, nor of the
contrary Tilton case, decided five years earlier.
Despite the definitive nature of the Illinois Supreme Court
opinion in Ogren, the spirit of the Tilton case was not fully put
to rest. Schlaf v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 16 is
one of several Illinois appellate decisions which appear to have
ignored the Ogren conclusion that the truth defense is qualified
in civil libel cases by reason of the 1870 constitution. In the
course of affirming a directed verdict for the defendant in an
action for slander, the appellate court stated, "[i] t is of course
true that in all cases where an action is brought in slander or
libel, proof of the truth of the statement is an absolute bar and
that such evidence as to truth can only be properly introduced
where there has been a plea of justification."' 7 It is this inattention to the 1870 constitution that is the troublesome aspect of
the Schlaf case. It must be conceded that the 1870 constitution
does not expressly change the absolute nature of the common
law truth defense in slander cases. The 1870 constitution, as
does the 1970 constitution, discusses the qualified truth defense
only in terms of "all libel cases."'18 Yet the Schlaf court seems
15. Id.at 416, 123 N.E. at 591 (1919).
16. 15 Ill. App. 2d 194, 145 N.E.2d 791 (1957). See also United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hollerich & Walgenbach Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d 156,
319 N.E.2d 280 (1974); Delsis v. Sepsis, 9 Ill. App. 3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138
(1972); Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 2d 154, 221
N.E.2d 516 (1966). Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 126, § 3 (1975), which since
1874 has stated that in slander or libel actions "it shall be competent for
the defendant to estabish the truth of the matter charged by a preponderance of testimony."
17. 15 Ill. App. 2d at 206, 145 N.E.2d at 796.
18. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. II § 4 (1870). But see
Kilbane v. Sabonjian, 38 Ill. App. 3d 172, 347 N..2d 757 (1976), where

264 The John Marshall Journal of Practiceand Procedure [Vol. 11:259
to imply that truth would be the same absolute justification in
libel cases as it was and is in slander cases. To so imply, however,
is to breathe life into the repudiated Tilton analysis.
Based on the higher precedential value of the Ogren case,
the orthodox law in Illinois has been that, at least in libel cases,
civil or criminal, the burden of proof is on -the defendant to prove,
first, that the libelous statement was true and, second, if the
statement was true, that it was published by the defendant with
good motives and justifiable ends.
THE WARNING OF NEW YORK TIMES

In 1964 the case of New York Times v. Sullivan 0 complicated the development of libel law under the 1870 Illinois
Constitution because henceforth state defamation law would
have to comply not only with the mandate of a state constitution,
but also with the higher mandate of the first amendment of the
United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court
in the New York Times decision established that public officials
who sued for libel relating to official conduct would have to
prove that the defendant published the statement with "actual
malice." The term "actual malice" meant that the plaintiffofficial must prove either that the defendant knew the defamatory statement was false or at least that the defendant published
the defamatory statement with reckless disregard for its truth
or falsity. The high standard of actual malice was later extended
20
to public figures and even to matters of public interest.
Furthermore, the Court in the New York Times case clearly indicated that the nature of a state truth defense to a libel charge
was equally a matter of first amendment interest subject to
21
Supreme Court review.
The holding of the New York Times case logically implies
the unconstitutionality of the Illinois qualified truth defense to
libel cases under the 1870 Illinois Constitution as interpreted by
the Illinois Supreme Court. If a defendant in Illinois were to
utter a true but defamatory statement regarding a public official,
public figure, or matter of public interest after the New York
the qualified truth defense of article I, section 4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution was apparently used as one ground for affirming dismissal of
a radio slander suit against the defendants, although the defendants
urged only absolute truth as a defense.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

20. Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)

(public figure);

(public interest).

But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (implicitly overruling Rosenbloom and limiting New York Times to public officials or
public figures).
21. 376 U.S. at 278, 286.
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Times case, that defendant would be exposed to liability for civil
or criminal libel under the 1870 constitution if the truth were
uttered without good motives or justifiable ends. Yet such a
possibility is in direct contradiction to the holding of New York
Times, which requires that such a defendant's culpability be
measured strictly by the mental yardstick of actual or reckless
knowledge of falsity and holds that any additional requirements
of good motives and justifiable ends are unconstitutional infringements upon the defendant's first amendment rights. The
Court's balancing of reputation against first amendment freedom
resulted in knowledge and recklessness becoming the only factors
which would force first amendment considerations to yield to
competing interests in reputation.
In another 1964 case, Garrison v. Louisiana,22 the district
attorney of Orleans Parish in Louisiana held a press conference
during which he issued critical statements against eight state
judges, generally disparaging their judicial conduct. State criminal defamation charges were brought against the defendant district attorney and he was subsequently convicted of criminal
defamation. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction and held that the New York Times requirement of
actual malice limited not only the ability of a public official to
bring a civil libel action but also the ability of a state tobring
criminal defamation charges for defamatory criticism of public officials. The ,Court expressly held that the Louisiana limitation of the truth defense in criminal libel cases to utterances
published with good motives and for justifiable ends was a
violation of the first amendment since such a qualified truth
defense, based as it is on the ill will of the defendant, exceeds the scope of actual malice as restrictively defined in New
York Times.23 The holding may extend to a broad category of
civil libel cases since Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
generally noted: "Truth may not be the subject of either civil or
criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned. '' 24 The Court, however, carefully left open the further
question of whether a qualified truth defense would be similarly
declared violative of the first amendment in a "purely private
'25
libel," one "totally unrelated to public affairs.
The predictable effect of the New York Times and Garrison
cases upon the validity of article II, section 4 of the 1870 Illinois
Constitution was not long in coming. The Illinois Appellate
22. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).

23. Id. at 69-74.

24. Id. at 74.
25. Id. at 72 n.8.
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Court first recognized the applicability of the New York Times
principle by using it, among other grounds, to affirm the dismissal of a civil libel complaint filed by a councilman and
businessman against various defendants for20 publishing false accusations of the plaintiff's tax delinquencies.

Not until the Illinois Supreme Court decision of Farnsworth
v. Chicago Tribune Co. 2 7 did the inherent constitutional incompatabilities of article II, section 4 and the first amendment

become unavoidable.

Farnsworth, an osteopathic physician,

brought a civil libel action against the Chicago Tribune Company
and against a feature writer of the Chicago Tribune for a series
of newspaper articles which allegedly libelled the plaintiff by

imputations of medical quackery, thereby destroying the plaintiff's medical practice. Based on his understanding of the New

York Times principle, the trial judge refused to charge the jury
with an instruction embodying the good motives and justifiable
ends language of article II, section 4 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution. The defendants were instead allowed to argue that the truth
of the statements was a sufficient defense both at common law
and under the freedom of speech and press guarantees of both the
federal and state constitutions. In the course of affirming the
jury verdict for defendants, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that if the plaintiff is a public person or the published articles
contain matters of public interest, the first amendment, as interpreted by New York Times, prohibits the invocation of the qualified truth defense. 28 Finding that the topic of medical quackery
was an issue of critical public concern, the court ultimately held
that the New York Times test was applicable and thus an instruction based upon -article II, section 4 was properly and constitu29
tionally refused.
26. Grabavoy v. Wilson, 87 Ill. App. 2d 193, 230 N.E.2d 581 (1967).
The special concurring opinion rejected the majority's reliance on the
New York Times case: "That opinion was written in the light of the
exigencies of the social ills of our times and much of the opinion as expressed must be considered dicta." Id. at 205, 230 N.E.2d at 587.
27. 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
28. It is therefore clear that the article II, section 4 provisions of the
Illinois constitution that truth is a defense in libel action only when
published with good motives and for justifiable ends [Ogren v.
Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 5871 when applied
to defamation of "public officials" or "public figures", is incompatible with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of the first
amendment guarantees of the Federal constitution. Accordingly, if
the plaintiff is a "public figure" or if, as hereinafter discussed, the
articles contain matters of public interest and concern so that the
Federal constitutional safeguards apply, the trial court was correct
in refusing to give the plaintiff's instruction based upon section 4
of article II.
Id. at 290, 253 N.E.2d at 410.
29. It is interesting to note that since the Farnsworth decision the
United States Supreme Court has retreated from its position that matters
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THE 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
By the time of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention,
both the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme
Court had made it abundantly clear that the qualified truth defense of the 1870 Illinois Constitution could not survive the first
amendment, at least as applied to libel cases involving matters
of public interest or libel actions brought by public officials or
public figures. Despite its awareness of these developments, the
1970 Illinois convention reenacted almost verbatim the former
article II, section 4 as the new article I, section 4 of the 1970
Illinois Constitution. As finally passed, article I, section 4 of the
1970 constitution provides:
All persons may speak, write and publish freely, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In trials for libel, both civil
and criminal, the truth when published with good motives and
for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense.8 0

What requires explanation is how the 1970 convention was
persuaded to permit the retention of the qualified truth defense
in all libel cases when both the United States Supreme Court
and the Illinois Supreme Court had prohibited such a defense
of public interest are subject to the New York Times standard. In Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (see text accompanying note
41 infra), the Court implicitly overruled its previous extension of the actual malice requirement in the plurality opinion of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an
ad hoc basis which publications address issues of "general or public
interest" and which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-government."
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S., at 79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges. Nor does
the Constitution require us to draw so thin a line between the drastic
alternatives of the New York Times privilege and the common law
of strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or general interest" test for determining the applicability of the New York Times
standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of
the competing values at stake.
418 U.S. at 346. As a result, if the Farnsworth case were presented to
the Illinois Supreme Court today it is likely that because Farnsworth
was a private individual, she would only be required to meet the negligence standard of Gertz.
Although the Court in Gertz chose to distinguish on its facts Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), that case also involved private plaintiffsprivate figures who had been thrust into the public spotlight because
they had been held captive in their home by escaped convicts. The
Court held that because their ordeal was a matter of public interest, the
plaintiffs had to prove that the falsity was published with actual malice
in order to recover. In light of Gertz the precedential value of this case
seems equally as imperiled as Farnsworth.
30. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4.

Since the Farnsworth decision is based upon the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution, that decision must be considered unaffected by the reenactment of Section 4
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in libel cases involving matters of public interest or in which
public officials or public figures were the plaintiffs. By a vote
of eleven to four, a majority of the Bill of Rights Committee,
despite its awareness of the New York Times decision and the
Farnsworth decision, preferred "to make no change in the circumstances in which truth would be a defense."3' The reasoning
behind the successful majority proposal to retain the qualified
truth defense was revealed during the floor debates when a
minority of the Bill of Rights Committee, led by the chairman,
Delegate Elmer Gertz, unsuccessfully offered alternate proposals
in place of the majority's retention of the 1870 qualified truth
provision. The main defenses of the retention proposal revolved
around considerations of individual rights and the significance
of the New York Times case. The argument was made that retention of the 1870 qualified truth defense would somehow better
protect individual freedom and individual rights than any of the
minority proposals. This reasoning was perhaps best summarized by Delegate Thomas C. Kelleghan:
Now let's not kid ourselves as to what's going on here.
This is a traditional and a sound and a fundamental right, and
this effort to rip these defenses out of our basic liberties is dis-2
turbing, and every one of you should be disturbed at this point8
Such support of the qualified truth defense as a fundamental
individual right carries a one-sided assumption that only plaintiffs would be affected by the proposal. However, in a libel case,
individuals can be found on either side of the case. Certainly
the qualified truth defense potentially presents a barrier more
easily overcome by an individual plaintiff than the more potent
absolute truth defense. Yet this slightly greater advantage offered an individual plaintiff would render correspondingly less
protection to an individual defendant who had to rely on a qualified truth defense rather than on an absolute truth defense.
The majority further argued that the New York Times
principle and its progeny could somehow become inapplicable.
Delegate Arthur T. Lennon suggested various ways by which the
New York Times principle could be neutralized:
So, I suggest to you (1) that those cases applied only to a
given set of facts; (2) the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the 1970 Constitution. By refusing to alter the language of Section 4, the Convention left the second sentence of Section 4 to apply

to libel cases not inconsistent with the Farnsworth holding and the
New York Times case and its progeny.
ILL. ANN. CONST. art. I, § 4, Commentary at 296 (Smith-Hurd 1970).

31. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
vol. 6 at 23, 25 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) was not cited in the report of the Bill
of Rights Committee nor discussed by name in the convention debates.
32. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 31, at 1410.
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like others, can always change, reverse, and modify; and (3)
what we in the majority of this committee are attempting to
some local protection on a subject of great imdo is to retain
33
portance.
This attempt to dismantle New York Times and Farnsworth by

limiting these cases to their facts disregards the intentionally
broad holdings of both cases. The difficulty of the traditional
Illinois qualified truth defense was not only its applicatiorn to
a particular set of facts, but also its unconstitutional application
to a whole category of cases involving, at the very least, public
officials, public figures, and matters of public interest. The desire to limit cases to their facts would, if rigorously pressed to
its ultimate conclusion, stymie the development of both the
common law and constitutional law. Without precedential value
beyond a specific factual context, legal principles would be relitigated to a judicial choking point. The further suggestion that
in some way the United States Supreme Court might reverse its
posture can only be interpreted as hopeful whimsy, because there
were no dissenting opinions in New York Times and the concurring opinions thought the majority did not go far enough in protecting defendants against libel suits by public officials.3 4 Nonetheless, the majority of the Bill of Rights Committee was able
to convince their convention colleagues to retain the qualified
truth defense in the 1970 constitution, even though it had been
declared unconstitutional in the cases of its most common application, those involving public affairs.
Delegate Gertz presented alternatives which would have
taken into account the substantial involvement of the United
States Supreme Court in areas which had formerly been considered matters of only state concern. Two minority proposals were
offered, either of which would have accommodated the holdings
of New York Times and Farnsworth. The first proposal of the

committee minority was a general one guaranteeing freedom of
the press and of speech: "Every person may freely speak, write
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty." 35 The purpose of this proposal was to avoid embedding the specifics of libel law in the new state constitution.
Delegate Dawn C. Netsch, who unsuccessfully moved to substi33. Id. at 1408.
34. "We would, I think, more faithfully interpret the First Amendment by holding that at the very least it leaves the people and the press
free to criticize officials and discuss public affairs with impunity."

376

U.S. 254, 296 (1964) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). "In my view,
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the
citizen and to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize
official conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and
abuses." Id. at 298 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
35. 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 31, at 139 (Minority Proposal IC (A)).
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tute this minority proposal for the majority committee retention
proposal, observed:
I would hate to see us caught in a position where, either affirmatively or by negative implication, we had, written any of the
current state of the law into our constitution, so that no matter
what the United States Supreme Court did in the future we

. .. we would not be able to
would not have any flexibility
30
change our own position.
The second proposal offered by Delegate Gertz on behalf of
the committee minority would have provided that truth shall not
be a defense in libel actions involving only private matters unless published with good motives and for justifiable ends.3 7 This
proposal would have answered certain concerns of the committee
majority. Those in favor of retention had continually asserted
what was felt to be a self-evident proposition: truth should not
be a defense in situations where the past misdeeds of a private
individual are dredged up after having been put to rest for many
years. 8 Furthermore, this compromise proposal would have accommodated the rulings of the United States Supreme Court and
the Illinois Supreme Court in regard to affairs and plaintiffs of
public interest, while at the same time retaining the traditional
qualified truth defense for purely private libels.
The key argument- offered against the second alternative was
the fear expressed by Delegate Leonard N. Foster that if the
courts should decide to "go back toward what we [had] in 1870,
we will not have embalmed and interred in our constitution what
appears to be the current thinking in the state of the law, which
as far as we can tell is in an extreme state of flux. ' 39 The
majority of the Bill of Rights Committee seemed convinced that
New York Times and Farnsworth were passing judicial aberrations. A rephrased version of this second alternative offered by
Delegate Netsch went down to defeat along with the first alter40
native.
36. 3

PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 31, at 1406.

Compare the remarks of

Delegate Helen C. Kinney:
I will support the minority position in this matter. I would have
the simple language of the Federal Constitution, because
feel that it does not preclude actions of libel or slander nor the
provisions for affirmative defenses thereto. To single out libel without talking about slander, and to provide specific remedies for it
seems to me inappropriate in a document which should be aimed
only at basic guarantees.

Lreferred

Id. at 1408.

Delegate Robert L. Butler in fact submitted an undebated

individual proposal modelled after the first amendment: "No law shall
be made abridging the freedom of speech, or the press." Id. at 3080.
37.. 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 31, at 139 (Minority Proposal 1C (B)).

38. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 31, at 1400.

39. Id. at 1413.
40. 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 31, at 308-09.
Although the proposal was never debated on the floor of the conven-
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Unfortunately, an unyielding majority refused to accept the
unconstitutionality of the 1870 qualified truth defense or the
practical alternatives suggested by the committee minority. Recent Supreme Court developments have not made the obstinacy
of the majority's action any less embarrassing. In fact, had the
second Gertz minority proposal been accepted, it too would now
be rendered unconstitutional in light of the evolving federal law
since 1970. Perhaps the ultimate irony lies in the fact that it
was Elmer Gertz himself who precipitated the Supreme Court
case which has made his second minority proposal constitutionally questionable.
THE DEVELOPING FEDERAL LAW AND THE
PRIVATE LIBEL PLAINTIFF

Four years after the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention
and the adoption of article I, section 4, the United States Supreme
Court issued its decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 4 1 This
decision has done nothing to alleviate the infirmities of article
I, section 4 under the first amendment and has instead probably
increased the extent of those constitutional infirmities.
In the Gertz case, Elmer Gertz, who had been chairman of
the Bill of Rights Committee at the 1970 Convention, filed a civil
libel action in federal district court for certain defamatory statetion, Delegate Henry T. Green offered a proposal to provide simply that
the defense of truth would be a sufficient defense in all libel cases without a requirement that the defendant prove good motives and justifiable
ends. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 31, at 2959 (No. 269).
One of the more interesting aspects of the debates on article I, section 4 was the implicit resurrection of the Tilton interpretation of the
Illinois qualified truth defense. Delegate Malcolm S. Kamin observed
at the outset of debate:
As I understand it, Mr. Foster, this provision at least, as I read
does not say that the truth shall never be a complete defense to a
libel. It merely says that the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable end (sic], shall always be a sufficient defense; Isn't that correct? Isn't this really a minimum statement of
what the defense "shall always be" rather than a statement of what
the defense "shall never be"?
MR. FOSTER: I suppose we could.interpret it that way, but
the courts I don't think_MR. KAMIN: I don't think the case has ever come up to the
courts in that way. I don't think any of the cases that you have
cited have said that. As a result, it seems to me that this whole
issue really is a tempest in a teapot, but I'll save that for the debate.
Id. at 1400.
However, Delegate Kamin did not participate in the subsequent debate on article I, section 4. Neither he nor the other delegates seemed
aware of the Tilton decision which had anticipated his interpretation
some 63 years earlier. The only answer to Delegate Kamin's interpretation was the Ogren case which had indirectly repudiated the reasoning
of the Tilton case without ever mentioning Tilton by name.
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See generally Note, Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.: Constitutional Privilege and the Defamed Individual, 8 J. MAR. J.
531 (1975).
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ments appearing in American Opinion, a monthly periodical of
the John Birch Society. After a jury. verdict for the plaintiff,
the district court decided that the New York Times standard applied because, even though plaintiff was neither a public official
nor a public figure, the publication dealt with a matter of public
interest. As a result, the trial court entered a judgment for the
defendant notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that
plaintiff's proof had not met the standard of New York Times.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Powell,
delivering the opinion of the Court, held that while the states
were constitutionally obligated under the first amendment to require that private individuals prove some fault in civil suits
against the publishers or broadcasters of injurious defamatory
falsehoods, private plaintiffs need not bear the greater burden
of New York Times, regardless of the subject matter of the libel.
Prior common law was thus in violation of the first amendment
to the extent that it allowed libel to be proved without fault.
The private individual suing for libel must at the very least show
that the defendant uttered the defamation in a negligent manner,
while a public official or public figure would still have to meet
the higher test of actual malice under the New York Times case
in order to prove liability. Finally, the Court held that a private
plaintiff is constitutionally obligated to meet the New York
Times definition of actual malice only in the event that punitive
damages are sought.
A critical issue is whether the Illinois qualified truth defense
has been completely put to rest by the reasoning in the Gertz
case. Under New York Times and Garrison, the qualified truth
defense is unconstitutional when public officials or public figures
attempt to rely on it. But if a private plaintiff is now obligated
to prove at least negligence in the utterance of the libel, then
it would appear equally violative of the first amendment to hold
liable a defendant who has communicated a true statement because the truth was not shown to have been published with good
motives and justifiable ends. Since the essential element of culpability under New York Times is the defendant's knowing or reckless consciousness of falsehood, then the parallel logic of Gertz
is that the culpability of a defendant accused of libel by a private
plaintiff must be based on defendant's lack of reasonable grounds
to believe the statement true. However, to find a defendant
liable under Gertz where the statement was in fact true would
be to find liability for carelessness in the air, which Justice
Cardozo early established as insufficient to prove negligence
4
at law. Z
42. "Negligence in the abstract apart from things related, is surely
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Indications in the New York Times and Gertz cases are that
truth, while sometimes damaging, is an important social value
to be protected. 43 The protection of some falsehood under the
fault standards of these cases is the price paid to avoid a chilling
effect upon potential speakers of the truth. If it is correct that
an essential element of liability under New York Times or Gertz
is the presence of careless or malicious falsehood rather than
truth, then article I, section 4 is constitutionally defective not
only in that it places the burden of the qualified truth defense
on defendants sued by public officials and public figures, but also
in the wider range of cases brought by private plaintiffs against
publishers or broadcasters. In both of these areas the qualified
truth defense leaves impermissibly open the distinct possibility
that a defendant can be held liable for a true statement because
of bad faith in uttering the truthful statement.
Although it is somewhat unclear whether the New York
Times-Gertz line of cases is limited to defendants who are newspaper companies and other media defendants, there is authority
for the proposition that the implications of New York Times and
Gertz necessarily apply to all defendants and that only the status
44
of the plaintiff is critical under these Supreme Court holdings.
If both individuals and media defendants are protected, then the
qualified truth defense is reduced to virtual uselessness. The
only remnant of constitutionality would adhere to slander cases
not covered by the explicit libel limitations of article I, section
not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all. .

. Negligence is not

a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and the commission
of a wrong imports the violation of a right. . .
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928)

."

Palsgraf v. Long Island
(Cardozo, C.J.) (citation

omitted).
43. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters."); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270,
279 (1964). See Hemingway v. Fritz, 96 Idaho 364, 366, 529 P.2d 264,
266 (1974) ("[F]ritz's [defendant's] motivation as to maliciousness in
publishing the material is irrelevant if the material is true.")
44. Jacron 'Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
Jacron involved an action for slander against a former employer for accusations of theft of company property. The court held in a case of first
impression throughout the country that Gertz applied to both media and
nonmedia defendants in both libel and slander actions. The case contains a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the impact of Gertz on state
defamation laws. See also Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship,
53 TEx. L. REv. 422 (1975); Brosnagan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz
v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975).
Interestingly, if we follow Karl Llewellyn's advice that the law is
what officials do, then an examination of New York Times reveals that
four private defendants as well as the New York Times Company reaped
the benefit of the new actual malice standard. 376 U.S. at 256, 292. This
implication was never considered when the Court decided Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), holding that private plaintiffs
must show only that the libelous material was published with negligent
regard for the truth.
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4. Yet even here there are indications that the principles of the
New York Times, Garrison, and Gertz cases must extend to
slander cases as well, if first amendment freedom is not to be
arbitrarily balkanized by the formal and often purely historical
distinctions between common law slander and libel. 45 In any
event, slander cases in Illinois are not governed by article I, section 4 so that presumably the common law absolute truth defense
still prevails in slander cases.
A

POTENTIAL LIMITATION ON AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO

SPEAK THE TRUTH-A RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The one countervailing argument that would protect the
Illinois qualified truth defense from Gertz is based on the
premise that the first amendment does not necessarily protect,
in all circumstances, the utterance of all truthful statements.
The strong social interest in allowing a private plaintiff to live
down the indiscretions of past private conduct arguably counterbalances any first amendment interests in the truthful revelation
of backyard gossip. -The desire to protect a private individual's
past was shared by both the majority and minority members of
46
the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention.
In modern times this social interest in the protection of
private, embarrassing, but true facts from the public eye has been
increasingly expressed in the modern tort action for breach of
privacy. 47 What the right of privacy action and the qualified
truth defense in libel cases have in common is the underlying
object of protecting privacy. If the modern right of privacy is
valid under the first amendment to the extent of making truth
irrelevant as a defense, then it seems that a qualified truth defense might also pass first amendment muster in libel cases
involving private plaintiffs.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,48 the name of a 17 year
old rape victim was obtained from official indictments available
to the public by a reporter who then televised the name over
a station owned by Cox Broadcasting Corporation. The father
of the deceased victim sued the reporter and the broadcasting
corporation for the invasion of his common law right to privacy
45. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).

See

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (criminal oral defamation).
46. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 31, at 1400; 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note
31, at 139 (Minority Proposal (1 C(B)).
47. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 809-12 (4th ed. 1971). Illinois
specifically recognizes this branch of the right to privacy; see, e.g.,

Midwest-Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d
274 (1975).
48. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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that occurred upon publication of his deceased daughter's identity. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that a privacy action
lay under the common law. In reversing the Georgia Supreme
Court, the United States Supreme Court noted the "face-off"
that existed in the case between the first amendment and
the right of privacy.49 The Court avoided deciding the faceoff by narrowly holding that the first amendment will not permit
the press to be held liable for truthfully publishing information
released to the public in official court records. Since the state's
interest in protecting its citizens from an invasion of privacy was
dissipated by the availability of information in public records,
the Court intentionally avoided deciding whether the press may
be held liable for publishing any information which is absolutely
true, however damaging it may be to an individual's sensibilities
or reputation.5 0
Justice Powell, who delivered the Court's opinion in Gertz,
stated in his concurring opinion in Cox that his only uncertainty
about the absolute priority of the first amendment was whether
"the Constitution may permit a different balance to be struck"
where privacy or other nonreputational interests are at stake.5 1
In fact, Justice Powell concurred in Cox on the narrow ground
that the interest of the state in protecting the privacy of its
citizens through allowance of a common law action for invasion
of privacy had been waived by the public availability of the court
records.
On the other hand, Justice Powell viewed Gertz as requiring
that truth be an absolute defense in libel cases, even in cases
where the plaintiff is a private individual. "It is fair to say that
if the statements are true, the standard contemplated by Gertz
cannot be satisfied." 52

It is safe to say, then, that if Justice

49. Id. at 489.
50. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice White explicitly
-postponed until another day the decision as to whether truth is absolutely protected by first amendment interests, regardless of any competing social interests in reputation or privacy:
The Court has nevertheless carefully left open the question
whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that truth
be recognized as a defense in a defamation action brought by a private person as distinguished from a public official or public figure. .

.

.

In similar fashion, Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, expressly

saved the question whether truthful publication of very private
matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally proscribed (citation omitted).
Those precedents, as well as other considerations, counsel similar
caution here. In this sphere of collision between the claims of privacy and those of the free press, the interests of both sides are
plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our
society.

Id. at 490-91.
51. Id. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 499.
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Powell's view is ascendant in the inevitable future libel case,
article I, section 4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution will become
a nullity insofar as the qualified truth defense is concerned in
libel cases.
GERTZ APPLIED IN ILLINOIS

In Troman v. Wood58 the Illinois Supreme Court applied the
requirements of Gertz to Illinois libel law. In Troman the plaintiff sued the Chicago Sun-Times and its reporter for an allegedly
libelous article which implied by photograph and story line that
the plaintiff's house was the headquarters for a gang of thieves
and that she was associated with the gang. In reversing a dismissal at the trial level, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
although the plaintiff was a private person, any public interest
in the subject matter of the story was irrelevant because the
Gertz case required only that a private plaintiff prove some
fault without necessarily meeting the actual malice test of New
York Times in order to establish liability. However, the Court
restricted this holding by further stating, "[o] ur holding in the
present case is, of course, not intended to remove any of the absolute or qualified privileges which have heretofore been recognized in this State to the extent that the facts may warrant their
'54
application."
This carefully stated holding addresses the propriety of the
qualified truth defense of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.5 5 As was
held in Troman, private plaintiffs must prove the published statement false and that the defendant lacked reasonable grounds to
believe the statement true. The qualified truth defense presupposes that a defendant who publishes a truthful libel is still responsible to the plaintiff if defendant fails to prove good motives
and justifiable ends. The burden on the plaintiff under Troman
and Gertz to prove careless falsity and the burden on the defendant under article I, section 4 to prove more than simple truth
are logically inconsistent burdens. If the private plaintiff fails to
prove falsity, then under Troman the plaintiff has failed to prove
a prima facie element of the case and it should be dismissed without requiring that the defendant prove either the affirmative defense of truth or good faith utterance of the truth. On the other
hand, if falsity is proven, leaving the plaintiff only with the burden of showing negligent publication, the defense of truth is un53. 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
54. Id. at 198, 340 N.E.2d at 299.
55. "Perhaps the key element in the court's opinion is its refusal to

make a reappraisal of the first amendment question." 64 ILL. B.J. 476,
477 (1976).
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available and the question of good faith utterance of truth can
never be reached. 56
CONCLUSION: Is THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 4
QUALIFIED TRUTH DEFENSE CONSTITUTIONAL?

The constitutional debility of article I, section 4 of the 1970
Illinois Constitution has been created by increasing acceptance of
the proposition that truth is an absolute value designed to be protected by the first amendment, regardless of circumstances.
Since the rationale behind the New York Times case is that some
falsity must be tolerated where actual malice cannot be proved
in order to preclude a chilling effect on potentially truthful statements, 5 7 then one might ultimately be led to the conclusion that
truth when found should be accorded absolute protection. Indeed, the classic justification for freedom of speech in the area
of opinions has been based on the concept that ideas should compete for acceptance. John Stuart Mill premised freedom of expression on the observation that a particular opinion may be true
and even if it was not true, a false opinion was still valuable
because it would serve as a helpful impetus to the finding of
56. Indications are that the Illinois Appellate Court is still applying
the qualified truth defense of article I, section 4 without noting any in-

consistency with the Gertz principle as applied by the Troman case. In
Welch v. Chicago Tribune Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 340 N.E.2d 539 (1975),
a fired employee of the Chicago Tribune Company sued the newspaper
company and its sports editor for defamatory statements posted on an
office bulletin board. The defendants contended that since the Illinois
Supreme Court in Farnsworth had held the qualified truth defense invalid under the 1870 Constitution, it was equally invalid under the 1970
Illinois Constitution; substantial truth of the charges against the employee should, therefore, be an absolute defense. The appellate court
rejected the argument by noting that good faith and justifiable motives
would have to be shown. The Farnsworth case was distinguished on
the ground that it concerned only plaintiffs who were public figures or
subjects of public interest, unlike the fired employee-plaintiff before the
court. In sustaining the suggestion that good motives and justifiable
ends had to be proven, the appellate court in Welch did not advert to
the implications of the Gertz case which had been decided after Farnsworth and before the Welch decision was issued, nor did it have available
the Troman decision which was decided a month after the Welch case.
Accord, Diedrich v. Northern Ill. Publishing Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 851, 350
N.E.2d 857 (1976); Kilbane v. Sabonjian, 38 Ill. App. 3d 172, 347 N.E.2d
757 (1976).
Despite the Welch case, there are still other inconsistent Illinois appellate cases which broadly indicate that truth is a sufficient defense in
libel cases without noting the qualified truth defense contained in Illinois
constitutional law. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hollerich,
22 Ill. App. 3d 156, 319 N.E.2d 280 (1974); Delsis v. Sepsis, 9 Ill. App.
3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138 (1972); Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 76
Ill. App. 2d 154, 221 N.E.2d 516 (1966); Schlaf v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 15 Ill. App. 2d 194, 145 N.E.2d 791 (1957).
57. 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964).
As the Court stated in New York Times v. Sullivan,...
"Allowance
of the defense of truth with the burden of proving it on the defend-
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truth. 58 At first blush it would seem inconsistent to protect some
falsehood in order to protect potential truth and then to abandon
that protection once truth is found merely because of the unsavory character of the truth-speaker.
Yet the test of this absolute commitment to truth is not in
the area of opinion but rather in the more offensive area of
factual assertion. The abstraction of an opinion does not defame
nor deceive because the very nature of the statement forewarns
that the discussion is still in the area of speculation.59 It is here
that the case for absolute freedom of expression becomes the
strongest. But when the statement is reduced to the stark
factual assertion that the plaintiff did commit a particular and
disgraceful act, the question of whether the act happened or not
is more than speculation. The traditional aphorism of Justice
Holmes that one does not have the right to yell "fire" in a
crowded theatre was expressly premised on the assumption that
the information was false.60 Yet what if there is in fact a fire
in the theatre?
The United States Supreme Court has recently expressed the
view that a state may not suppress truthful information about
a lawful activity because of a fear that the release of such information may have an adverse effect on the recipients or disseminators of the information. 6 ' Although truthful factual assertions may be generally protected as an absolute value when
there are no other significant competing values, it does not follow
that the truth of a factual assertion is always constitutionally
protected regardless of circumstance. One may be protected by
the Constitution for yelling "fire" in a theatre which is in fact
aflame because no interest is served in suppressing the warning.
But even if in fact John Doe did steal hubcaps some thirty years
ant does not mean that only false speech will be deterred." The First

Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to
protect speech that matters.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974).
58. J.S. MILL, ON-

LIBERTY

76 (Penguin ed. 1974).

59. Opinions typically do not justify reliance in either defamation or
misrepresentation actions. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 74142, § 109, at 720-24 (4th ed. 1971).

60. "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (emphasis added).
61. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingsboro, 97 S.
Ct. 1614, 1620 (1977), where the Court struck down as violative of the
first amendment a township ordinance banning "For Sale" and "Sold"
signs from residential property, though the alleged township interest was
to promote stable and racially integrated housing. But cf. Chicago Real

Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793 (1967)

(Chicago ordinance prohibiting distribution of written material designed
to induce "panic peddling" held constitutional against first amendment

challenge).
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ago, there are interests involved other than the social value of
truth. Of greatest concern is a strong social recognition of a right
to privacy which has been accorded protection under the Constitution as well as by common law.6 2 Society has an interest in encouraging rehabilitation by allowing the misdeeds of the past to
be buried by time63 and in preventing emotional injury to others
unaware of the private and embarrassing truth. Both of these
interests would be eroded if backyard gossip were to be protected
in all circumstances simply because of its socially insignificant
truth. Perhaps Justice Powell's conjecture in Cox that a different constitutional balance may be struck in the privacy area
is a harbinger for future cases.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that merely because a state
could ignore the truth defense or reduce it to a qualified defense
in right of privacy cases, the same result will occur in libel cases
involving the qualified truth defense of article I, section 4 of the
1970 Illinois Constitution. Unlike the right to privacy, the
Supreme Court has concluded that the reputational interests protected by traditional libel law do not of themselves deserve protection under the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution or under federal civil rights statutes because they do not
involve "liberty" or "property" interests in the constitutional
sense. 64 This is in accord with the perception of Justice Powell
in the Gertz case that even the reputational interests of a private
plaintiff must give way to truth in a libel case.
More generally, it is difficult to perceive any legitimate
damage to reputation in a libel case where the statement made
of the plaintiff is in fact true and only the good faith of the
defendant is questioned. Courts are not obligated to compensate
for a false reputation of virtue which has been built by concealing private acts of vice. This principle appears to lie at the heart
of the common law maxim that truth was an absolute defense
in civil libel cases. 65 Though reputation may not be compensable,
the violation of privacy itself may be egregious enough to warrant compensation. The interests being protected by libel actions
and by that branch of privacy which protects against the disclo62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (same). For recent
common law protection of privacy, see generally W. PRoss_, LAW OF
TORTS

§ 117 (4th ed. 1971).

63. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 292, 297 P. 91, 93
(1931): "Where a person has by his own efforts rehabilitated himself,
we, as right-thinking members of society, should permit him to continue
in the path of rectitude rather than throw him back into a life of shame
or crime."
64. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
65. See note 4 supra.

280 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11:259
sure of private and embarrassing facts are not identical. The
indication of recent Supreme Court trends is that the right
of privacy may well be a sufficient exception to the general
principle that the factual assertion of truth is absolutely protected under the first amendment. 66
There is another reason to suggest that article I, section 4
is subject to constitutional infirmity, even beyond the first
amendment strictures of the Gertz and New York Times cases.
The qualified truth defense in article I, section 4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution is limited to criminal and civil trials for libel.
By its terms it does not apply to slander cases. The basic distinction between libel and slander has been that the former is
usually written and the latter usually oral in nature. This distinction has never been a completely consistent one and the
modern technologies of radio and television are said by eminent
authority not to fit "the rather senseless distinctions inherited
from the sixteenth century." 7 Yet the Illinois Criminal Code
of 1961 allows truth, when communicated with good motives and
justifiable ends, to constitute an affirmative defense to the crime

of "criminal defamation." The crime of "criminal defamation"
does not distinguish between written and oral defamation and
in fact refers to defamatory communications made by any
means.6 8 Therefore, the posture of Illinois law is such that article
I, section 4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution discriminates between
libel and slander, limiting a defendant to a qualified truth defense in a libel case but presumably still permitting the common
law defense of absolute truth in slander cases. However, the
Illinois Criminal Code establishes that the qualified truth defense
is available in any kind of criminal defamation, be it libel or
slander. The net result is that only in a civil slander case does
a defendant possess the original common law defense of absolute
truth.
The troublesome distinctions between common law libel and
slander are rendered even more incapable of rationalization in
66. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 754 (4th ed. 1971).

See also

Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 340, 207 N.E.2d
482, 484 (1965) ("A defamation designed for visual perception is a libel;
an oral defamation is a slander.")
68. "A person commits criminal defamation when, with intent to defame another, living or dead, he communicates by any means to any per-

son matter which tends to provoke a breach of the peace." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 27-1 (a) (1975). "In all prosecutions for criminal defamation, the truth, when communicated with good motives, and for justifiable ends, shall be an affirmative defense." Id. § 27-2.
A similar California statute was found totally void in light of Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). See Eberle v. Municipal Court, 55
Cal. App. 3d 423, 127 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1976).
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light of the crazy quilt distinction between libel and slander in
Illinois statutory and constitutional law. If a criminal defendant
in a prosecution for criminal defamation by slander were to raise
the defense of unequal protection under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, it is not at all clear that
the Illinois constitutional and statutory scheme would survive,
since the Supreme Court has clearly held that state restrictions
on first amendment freedoms must be justified in terms of a compelling state interest rather than on the basis of mere rationality.6 9 It is questionable what compelling state interest is served
by requiring criminal defendants to make do with a qualified
truth defense in criminal defamation by slander whereas a defendant in a civil slander case has an absolute truth defense.
In summary, the qualified truth defense set forth in article
I, section 4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution is clearly a violation
of the first amendment in relation to public plaintiffs suing in
libel. In addition, that provision also stands in grave jeopardy
of being declared a violation of the first amendment even beyond
cases involving public plaintiffs. Since the Illinois Supreme
-Court has expressly limited the truth defense to good faith and
justifiable motives, 70 it would be impossible for the United States
Supreme Court to conclude that article I, section 4 has been interpreted by Illinois courts to implicitly allow an absolute truth
defense. These constitutional questions surrounding the qualified truth defense in Illinois could all have been avoided by
adopting the first minority proposal submitted by Delegate Gertz
at the convention: "Every person may speak, write and publish
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." 71
This first minority proposal would have allowed the 1970 Illinois
Constitution to remain a flexible instrument, adaptable to the
rapid changes in traditional defamation law which have proceeded apace in recent years. Finally, the Illinois experience
illustrates the proposition that a state bill of rights should be a
general statement of basic social principles, rather than a detailed
set of legal rules likely to be swept onto the barrier reef of
changing federal constitutional law.
69. "The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment
freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
liams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).

Accord, Wil-

70. See, e.g., Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123

N.E. 587 (1919); People v. Taylor, 279 Ill. 481, 117 N.E. 62 (1917).

71. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. Delegates Roy C.
Pechous and Peter A. Tomei also offered undebated individual proposals
identical to the first minority proposal offered by Delegate Gertz. 7 POCEEDINGS, supra note 31, at 2961, 3043 (Nos. 275 &433).

